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where a bankruptcy court in Mississippi ruled it had the authority derived from multiple sources
to permanently disbar an attorney from practicing before its district.11 These actions were taken
by the court because of multiple offenses by the attorney12 and the seriousness of his
misconduct.13 The In re Dobbs court found this as an instance where the only way to deter the
future misconduct of the attorney was to disbar him.14 Further the In re Dobbs court stated the
purpose of the disbarment is not for punishment,15 but instead to protect the general public.16
Moreover, besides the court-issued disbarments by the In re Dobbs Court,17 there have been
other examples of this discipline, by bankruptcy18 and non-bankruptcy courts.19 Therefore, the
authority to disbar an attorney from practicing before the court is not limited to the bankruptcy
court.

themselves with the Local Rules. Attorneys shall be subject to appropriate sanctions for failure to
comply with these sanctions for failure to comply with these Local Rules, Bankruptcy Code, the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure or other applicable law).
9
See id. (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)(explaining, “[i]t has long been
understood that ‘[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily results to our Courts of justice from
the nature of their institution,’ powers ‘which cannot be dispensed within a Court, because they
are necessary to exercise of all others.”
10
535 B.R. 675 (N.D. Miss. 2015).
11
See id. at 690.
12
See id. at 693-697 (explaining the attorney had been reprimanded by the local bar association
on at least three occasions yet the discipline had still not deterred the attorney’s misconduct).
13
See id. at 698-99. (holding the attorney had submitted falsified documents, declaring his
former client wished to file bankruptcy without his client’s knowledge or authorization).
14
See id.
15
See In re Dobbs, 535 B.R. 675 at 698-99.
16
See id. at 698.
17
See id. at 699.
18
See In re Parker, 485 F. App’x 989 (11th Cir. 2012)(upholding a bankruptcy courts’ ruling to
disbar an attorney for repeated misconduct before the court).
19
See In re Molty, 320 F. App’x 244 (5th Cir. 2009); In Re Smith, 76 F.3d 335 (10th Cir. 1996)
(all holding the court has the authority and discretion to disbar an attorney from practicing before
its district).
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Again, bankruptcy courts as well as other courts have ruled it has the authority to disbar
an attorney,20 but the courts have stated it will only used this authority in the narrowest instances
where the court believes it must protect the public from the attorneys it finds not to fit practice
law instead of a general punishment.21
This article will examine how a bankruptcy court has the authority and discretion to
permanently sanction an attorney from practicing before it. Part I discusses: (i) statutory powers
granted to the court under the Bankruptcy Code; (ii) authority of the court derived from the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure as well as recognized Local Rules of the court; and (iii)
establish inherent court powers. Part II discusses particular examples of when the bankruptcy
courts as well as other courts have used its authority to disbar attorney. Finally, Part III discusses
and analyzes the discretion the courts will use when administering the sanction of permanent
disbarment.
I.

Source of Judicial Authority and Discretion in Disciplining Attorneys
The bankruptcy courts as well as other courts have the discretion to use its authority to

disbar an attorney from practicing before its district.22 This authority or power derives from
many established statutes,23 rules,24 and from inherent powers already recognized by the court.25
When exercised together, the courts may find its authority and discretion to not only discipline
attorneys that practice before it, but also disbar them as well.26
A.

Section 105 Provides Authority for Courts to Regulate Appearances

20

See In re Dobbs, 535 B.R. 675 at 699.
See id. at 699.
22
See id.
23
See 11 U.S.C. § 105; 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(2); and 11 U.S.C. 526 (a)(5).
24
See FED R. of BANKR. P.9011(c).
25
See supra note 7 and accompanying text and notes.
26
See In re Dobbs, 535 B.R. 675 at 690, 699.
21
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Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code provides bankruptcy courts with broad powers to
carry out the courts’ duties.27 The statute specifically states, “[a] bankruptcy court has statutory
authority to issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.”28 By the very language and word choice of the statute,
Congress’ intent was to give bankruptcy courts a general “catch all” provision so that the courts
can regulate appearances before it.
According to the legislative history of section 105, Congress intended to formulate the
statute to give bankruptcy courts broad administrating powers.29 In 1978, when Congress
enacted section 105, it codified this “implied power” into section 105(a) that by its very words
broadcast a wide interpretation of authority and discretion.30
Further, bankruptcy courts have previously interpreted section 105(a) as granting the
court with a broad range of authority and discretion in order to carry out its duties.31 The court
has specifically stated “[t]he clear language of 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) grants this [c]ourt significant
equitable powers as well as latitude in framing the relief necessary to carry out both the specific
provisions of the statute as well as its philosophical underpinnings.”32 Combining the court’s
previous interpretation of the section 105(a) with the legislative history, as well as the very
words that are stated within the statute, a court can determine that section 105 is one source it
can derive the authority and discretion to disbar an attorney from practicing before its district.
B.

Section 526 Allows the Courts to Sanction Attorneys for Dishonesty

27

See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
See id.
29
See COLLIER ON BANRUPTCY, ¶ 105.02 [1][b] (Alan Resnick & Henry J. Somme reds., 16th ed.
2009).
30
See id.
31
See In re Dobbs, 535 B.R. at 690.
32
See id. (quoting In re Ludwick, 185 B.R. 238, 245 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1995).
28
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Under section 526(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, “a debt relief agency shall not make
any statement, or counsel or advise any assisted person or prospective assisted person to make a
statement in a document filed in a case or proceeding under this title, that is untrue or
misleading, or that upon the exercise of reasonable care, should have been known by such
agency to be untrue or misleading.”33 Section 526 (a)(2) can be interpreted as a general
guideline, with rules, for attorneys who practice in front of the bankruptcy court. The statute
specifically states that an attorney must exercise honesty in front of the court when preforming
their duties. Additionally, if an attorney intentionally violates section 526(a)(2), the court can
enforce sanctions and discipline against an attorney who intentionally violates the statute under
section 526(a)(5)34 which, “permits a bankruptcy court to ‘impose an appropriate civil penalty’
against an attorney who if finds intentionally violated [section] 526(a)(2).”35 This statute gives
the court the discretion to fashion suitable punishments for attorneys, who the court discovers
and believes, demonstrated conduct that is not appropriate under 526(a)(2). Applied together,
sections 526(a)(2) and 526(a)(5) can provide the court an additional source to derive its authority
and discretion to disbar an attorney from practicing in its district.
C.
The Court May Sanction Attorneys Who It Finds Violated Rule 9011 of the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedures or the Local Bankruptcy Rules
The bankruptcy court can also derive its authority from the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedures as well. Similar to section 526,36 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 9011
serves as an administration guideline for attorneys that if violated, the courts may issue

33

See 11 U.S.C. § 526 (a)(2).
See 11 U.S.C. § 526 (a)(5).
35
See id.
36
See 11 U.S.C. § 526.
34
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appropriate sanctions to enforce the guideline.37 Rule 9011(b) states, “[b]y presenting to the
court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a petition, pleading, written
motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances,
1.)
it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
2.)
the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law or the establishment of new law;
3.)
the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
4.)
the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically
so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.38
Rule 9011(b) specifically states a general guideline for attorneys to adhere regarding proper
practices when practicing in front of the court, which is similar to section 526(2).39 Both Rule
9011(b)40 and Section 526(a)(2)41 outline what is appropriate behavior that the court expects
litigators to observe in front of it. It also states what the court will not allow, specifically
dishonesty. Further, Rule 9011 is similar to Section 526 because it has its own punishment, for

37

See FED. R. of BANKR. P. 9011(c).
See FED. R. of BANKR. P. 9011(b).
39
See 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(2).
40
See FED R. of BANKR. P. 9011(b).
41
See 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(2).
38
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the court to exercise, built into the rule.42 Under Rule 9011(c) the court has the authority and
discretion to administer appropriate punishments for violators of Rule 9011(b).43 Rule 9011(c)
states, “If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that
subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose
an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision
(b) or are responsible for the violation.”44 Again, similar to section 526(a)(5), Rule 9011(c)
gives the court broad discretion to administer proper punishment for violators.45
Additionally, bankruptcy courts may have local rules that supplement the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure in stating that attorneys must abide by certain guidelines when
practicing before the court or be subject to the court’s authority.46 For example, Mississippi
Bankruptcy Local Rule 1001-1(g) states “[a]ll attorneys practicing before the bankruptcy courts
for the Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi shall acquaint themselves with these Local
Rules. Attorneys shall be subject to appropriate sanctions for failure to comply with these Local
Rules.”47 Similar to previous rules and federal statutes mentioned, the court again is left with
board discretion and authority to administer over attorneys’ conduct and fashion appropriate
sanctions and disciplines when their conduct falls below the court prescribe guidelines.48
D.

The Court May Also Derive its Authority from Established Inherent Court Powers

42

See FED R. of BANKR. P. 9011; 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(2) (explaining under both Rule 9011 and
Section 526(a)(2), the court itself, may punish a violator of either Rule 9011 or Section
526(a)(2).
43
See FED R. of BANKR. P. 9011(c).
44
See id.
45
See id.
46
See LBR 1001-1(g), Bankr. N.D. and S.D. Miss.
47
See id.
48
See id.
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The court can also look to its “implied or inherent power” that is vested in it, to control
parties that practice in front of the court. For example, in Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.,49 the court
explained, “It long has been understood that ‘[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to
our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution,’ powers ‘which cannot be dispensed
with in a court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.’”50 This language clearly
states that the implied powers invested in the court can be used in preforming its duties, which
includes controlling the parties practicing in front of it and sanctioning attorneys when necessary.
The court further explained that its inherent powers gives the court the power to sanction
attorneys appearing before the court as long as the court can show that the attorney or litigant
acted in bad faith or was dishonest.51 Therefore, the court can look to its implied or inherent
power as well in deriving the authority to issue appropriate sanctions and disciplines that it sees
fit against attorneys that practice before it.
II.

Examples the Bankruptcy and Other Courts’ Using its Authority to Issue Sanctions
of Permanent Disbarment
A.

In re Dobbs’ Specific Illustration of the Bankruptcy Court’s Authority to Disbar

Recently in In re Dobbs52, a Mississippi bankruptcy court held that it had the authority
derived from multiple sources,53 to sanction and to permanently disbar an attorney from

49

501 U.S. 32 (1991).
See id. at 43.
51
See In re Yorkshire, LLC 540 F.3d. 328, 332 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining, “It is well-settled
that a federal court, acting under its inherent authority, may impose sanctions against litigants or
lawyers appearing before the court so long as the court makes a specific finds that they engaged
in bad faith conduct”).
52
535 B.R. 675 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2015).
53
See 11 U.S.C. § 105; 11 U.S.C. 526(a)(2); and 11 U.S.C. 526 (a)(5); FED R. of BANKR. P.
9011(c)2; and LBR 1001-1(g), Bankr. N.D. and S.D. Miss. (These multiple sources establish that
the court has authority and discretion to fashion appropriate sanctions for attorneys that
practicing before the court).
50
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practicing in its district.54 The court found that the sanction of permanent disbarment was
appropriate because of the attorney’s repeated acts of misconduct while practicing in front of the
court, as well as the severity of his misconduct.55 The court found that it had no choice but to
permanently disbar the attorney from practicing in front of its district in order to protect the
general public from the attorney’s misconduct.56
In In re Dobbs, the attorney (“First Attorney”) was hired to represent a debtor and his
wife who filed a joint chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in 2013.57 Following dismissal of the
original 2013 case, the First Attorney filed a subsequent 2015 bankruptcy petition on behalf of
the debtor but not the debtor’s wife.58 The 2015 bankruptcy petition was accompanied with a
Certificate of Credit Counseling (“First Certificate”) falsely reflecting that the debtor had
attended a credit-counseling course on March 26, 2015,59 as required by Section 109 of the
United States Bankruptcy (“the Code”).60 The 2015 petition listed the First Attorney as the
debtor’s counsel and purportedly included the debtor’s electronic signature debtor’s electronic
signature.61 Following the court’s approval of the First Attorney’s request to withdraw as
counsel, the debtor hired a new attorney (“Second Attorney”).62 The Second Attorney filed
another Certificate of Credit Counseling (“Second Certificate”) on behalf of the debtor, which
indicated the debtor actually completed credit counseling on April 8, 2015.63

54

See In re Dobbs 535 B.R. at 690, 699.
See id. at 698, 699.
56
See id.
57
See id. at 680.
58
See id.
59
See id.
60
See In re Dobbs, 535 B.R. at 680.
61
See id.
62
See id.
63
See id.
55
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Because of the discrepancy between the two certificates, the court entered an Order to
Show Cause and scheduled a hearing in the debtor’s case.64 At the Show Cause Hearing, the
debtor testified that he did not know the First Certificate was filed nor did he authorize his First
Attorney to file the bankruptcy petition.65 He further testified that he neither signed the petition
nor completed pre-petition credit counseling for the 2015 case.66 The debtor claimed not to be
even aware of the 2015 case until after it was commenced.67 The court then issued a Show
Cause Order for the First Attorney because of the debtor’s troubling testimony.68 In response to
the Show Cause Order, the First Attorney sent a letter to the court stating that he received a
phone call from the debtor’s wife describing how the debtor wanted him to file a new case to
prevent the debtor from losing property belonging to his mother.69 The First Attorney also stated
that the debtor’s wife completed the credit counseling class, and he knew that the debtor did not
take class before he filed the certificate.70 The First Attorney explained that he believed his
actions were necessary to stay a pending foreclosure on the mobile home in which the debtor
lived.71
The court, however, found the First Attorney did not explain why the decision to file
should appropriately be made by the debtor's estranged wife, instead of the debtor.72 Finding
that the First Attorney had violated multiple statutes and rules and that this was also not his first
deliberate act of misconduct, the court ruled it was necessary to permanently disbar the First
64

See id. at 680-81.
See In re Dobbs 535 B.R. at 681.
66
See id.
67
See id. (explaining debtor had not been in First Attorney’s office since December 2014 or
January 2015).
68
See id. at 682.
69
See id.
70
See In re Dobbs, 535 B.R. at 682.
71
See id. at 683.
72
See id.
65
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Attorney from practicing in its district.73 By assessing factors from both the American Bar
Association (“ABA”)74 and local professional standards75 and applying case law, the court
concluded that it had discretion to “disbar an attorney only upon presentation of clear and
convincing evidence sufficient to support the findings of one or more violations warranting this
extreme sanction.”76 Finding sufficient evidence of repeated ethical violations, the court
sanctioned and permanently disbarred the First Attorney.77
B.

Examples of Other Courts Using Its Authority and Discretion to Disbar Attorneys

Additionally, In re Dobbs was not an exception or irregularly. Before the In re Dobbs
Court disbarred an attorney from practicing before its district,78 an Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a bankruptcy court’s decision to disbar an attorney.79 In In re Parker, the Court
of Appeals ruled that a bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when the bankruptcy court
disbarred an attorney from practicing before.80 Similar to the attorney in In re Dobbs,81 the

73

See id. at 683, 695-98, 699.
See In re Dobbs, 535 B.R. at 697 (observing ABA “Standards for Imposing Sanction” four
criteria: “(1) whether the duty violated was to a client, the public, the legal system, or the
profession, (2) whether the attorney acted intentionally, knowingly, or negligently, (3) the
seriousness of the actual or potential injury caused by the attorney’s misconduct; and (4) the
existence of aggravating and mitigating factors”).
75
See id. at 696–97 (assessing Liebling factors which are: (1) the nature of the [attorney]’s
conduct, (2) the need to deter such conduct, (3) the preservation of dignity and reputation of the
legal profession, (4) the need to protect the public, (5) sanctions imposed in similar cases, (6) the
duty involved, (7) the lawyer's mental state, (8) actual and potential injury resulting from the
misconduct, and (9) the existence of aggravating factors).
76
See In re Dobbs, 535 B.R. at 699 (quoting In re Medrano, 956 F.2d 101, 102 (5th Cir. 1992)
(stating court could “disbar an attorney only upon presentation of clear and convincing evidence
sufficient to support the findings of one or more violations warranting this extreme sanction”).
77
See id. at 691.
78
See id. at 699.
79
See In re Parker, 485 F. App’x 989 (11th Cir. 2012).
80
See id. at 992.
81
See In re Dobbs, 535 at 683-90 (explaining that the lawyer committed multiple violations of
the Bankruptcy Code, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and Local Rules).
74
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attorney in In re Parker82 committed multiple violations of the Bankruptcy Code, Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure, and Local Rules.83 In particular, the court found that the attorney had
made multiple false statements to the court as well.84 Therefore, the Court of Appeals upheld the
bankruptcy court’s decision to disbar the attorney from practicing before its district.85
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district courts ruling to disbar an
attorney for a year. In In re Moity,86 the court found that a one-year disbarment was appropriate
in relations to the attorney’s misconduct. There, the attorney committed misconduct over a phone
conversation with a law clerk,87 additional misconduct through legal documents submitted to the
court,88 and then made false statements regarding past disciplinary sanctions during a legal
proceeding.89 Because of these transgressions against the court, and a history of misconduct
before the state court,90 the Fifth Circuit upheld the federal court’s ruling to disbar the attorney.
91

Further, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disbarred an attorney for violating the court’s
suspension order and practicing in its district without the courts authorization.92 In In Re

82

485 F. App’x 989 (11th Cir. 2012).
See id at 992.
84
See id.
85
See id.
86
320 F. App’x 244 (5th Cir. 2009).
87
See id. at 245–46. (holding the phone conversation from the attorney to the law clerk,
“displayed severe disrespect to the court by the anger and harsh tone shown to a representative of
the magistrate judge”).
88
See id. at 247.(stating the attorney filed a length brief, which was highly critical of two district
court judges, during his contempt hearing regarding his misconduct of the phone conversation
with the law clerk.).
89
See id. at 246 (explaining the attorney made a false statement that he had not been disciplined
beyond the certain penalties he admitted, when in fact he had to be brought before the court for a
second time for failure to comply with the administered original penalties).
90
See id. at 249.
91
See In re Molty, 320 F. App’x at 249.
92
See In re Smith, 76 F.3d 335 (10th Cir. 1996).
83
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Smith,93 an attorney was disbarred by the Tenth Circuit because he was originally suspended for
a year for filing frivolous claims and not paying sanction cost, but violated the court order
suspension by continuing to practice law before the Tenth Circuit.94 The court exercised its
discretion to disbar the attorney because it found that the attorney, after multiple warnings by the
court, failed to adhere to the order of the court, and therefore, disbarment was warranted.95
III.

The Bankruptcy Court will Exercise Self-Impose Discretion When It Uses its
Discretion to Disbar an Attorney
Moving forward, the bankruptcy court recognized it will use careful discretion in

exercising its authority to sanction attorneys that come before it.96 This self-impose discretion
calls for the bankruptcy court to only use its authority to disbar attorneys in the most extreme
cases of misbehavior demonstrated by an attorney.97 Moreover, the court states that the authority
to disbar an attorney is not for the sake of punishing the attorney,98 but instead to protect the
general public from these attorneys who warrant this extreme sanction.99 Therefore, in
exercising this discretion, the court will use different factors to analyze whether the authority to
disbar an attorney should be exercise.100
In exercising its discretion to disbar an attorney, the court may look at certain factors that
have been considered when fashioning appropriate sanctions.101 Some of these factors can be
found from case law.102 For example, the In re Dobbs court looked at the case Liebling v. The

93

76 F.3d 335 (10th Cir. 1996).
See id. at 335, 336.
95
See id.
96
See In re Dobbs, 535 B.R. at 698.
97
See id. at 699.
98
See id.
99
See id.
100
See id. at 696 (citing Liebling v. The Mississippi Bar, 929 So.2d 911, 918 (Miss. 2006).
101
See Liebling, 929 So.2d at 918.
102
See id.
94
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Mississippi Bar.103 There, a Complaint Tribunal considered nine factors in fashioning
appropriate factors.104 The nine factors the Complaint Tribune considered were: (1) the nature of
the [attorney]’s conduct, (2) the need to deter such conduct, (3) the preservation of dignity and
reputation of the legal profession, (4) the need to protect the public, (5) sanctions imposed in
similar cases, (6) the duty involved, (7) the lawyer's mental state, (8) actual and potential injury
resulting from the misconduct, and (9) the existence of aggravating factors.105
Additionally, the court can also look to the previously mentioned ABA Standards in
Imposing Sanctions.106 These factors are: (1) the duty violated, (2) the lawyer’s violated, (3) the
actual and potential injury resulting from the misconduct, and (4) the existence of aggravating or
mitigating factors.107 The court has in the past analyzed and assesses the ABA factors in
fashioning appropriate sanctions previously in the case In re Sealed Appellant.108 Taken
together, the court can look to all of these factors mentioned as guidelines in assessing whether
to fashion a sanction such as permanent disbarment.
IV.

Conclusion
Based on findings that its ability is derived from federal statutes,109 the Federal Rules of

Bankruptcy,110 local rules,111 and inherent federal court powers,112 the bankruptcy court does

103

929 So. 2d 911 (Miss. 2006).
See id. at 918.
105
See id.
106
See In re Dobbs, 535 B.R. at 697.
107
See id.
108
194 F.3d 666, 673 (5th Cir.1999) (explaining, “In imposing a sanction after a finding of
misconduct, a court should consider the duty violated, the attorney’s mental state, the actual or
potential injury caused by the attorney’s misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or
mitigating factors”).
109
See 11 U.S.C. § 105; 11 U.S.C. 526(a)(2); and 11 U.S.C. 526 (a)(5).
110
See FED R. of BANKR. P. 901l(c).
111
See LBR 1001-1(g), Bankr. N.D. and S.D. Miss.
112
See supra notes 8 and accompanying notes and text.
104
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have the authority to it permanently disbar an attorney from practicing in its district, which is
best illustrated in the case In re Dobbs.113 In addition, this authority is not limited to the
bankruptcy court.114 However, in exercising the discretion to use its authority to permanently
disbar an attorney, the court may look to applicable criteria and factors in analyzing when and
why it would permanently disbar an attorney.115

113

See In re Dobbs 535 at 690.
See supra notes 18 and 19 and accompanying notes and text.
115
See supra notes 70 and 71.
114
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